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*Title:* Inferentialism and tonk: the big picture

*Abstract:* Inferentialism cannot be considered as a specific theory, perhaps not even a program, but rather as a certain way of approaching semantic, logical and epistemological problems. In its origins it was a proposal of semantic nature, which tries to offer an account of the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of inferences. It falls within theories of meaning in terms of use and it is formulated as an alternative to the specification of meaning in terms of truth conditions.

I intend to focus on Logic, which seems to be the natural place of inferentialism. Being inferentialist in logic might imply accepting that the meaning of logical expressions is established through rules of inference. Now, two other theses usually accompany this semantic idea. On the one hand, a thesis concerning the justification of the rules of inference, on the other hand, a thesis concerning the nature of validity and the notion of logical consequence. The first suggests that the link between the meaning of logical expressions and the corresponding inference rules provides some kind of justification for such rules. As for the second thesis, inferentialism assumes that the validity of inferences arises from the meaning of certain expressions that occur in them.

There seems to be some agreement that this sort of general scheme has been challenged by tonk. There is some consensus that tonk is a problem exclusively for an inferentialist approach. The general idea is that if it is enough to specify rules to give meaning to logical expressions, which are thus in some way justified, and from which a notion of validity arises; then we have to welcome tonk. And, as it is well known, this new member comes with problems. With regard to what these problems are and what their scope is, there has been no agreement since the beginning of this discussion.

In this paper I intend to explore the problems that tonk gives rise to, what their scope is and whether those problems are exclusive to inferentialism or they also reach a truth conditional semantics approach. I will argue that tonk's analysis highlights that there are certain basic commitments about what logic is that seems to transcend different ways of conceiving the discipline. I will also argue that a complete answer to the problems opened by tonk implies facing some central questions about what logic is, what its link with natural language and linguistic practice is and how its normativity is to be understood. From my point of view, these questions should be tackled by any project that shares inferentialist ambitions.