Tercer Workshop IIF-UNAM – BA-Logic de Lógica Filosófica

Tercer Workshop IIF-UNAM – BA-Logic de Lógica Filosófica

March 6, 2025
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Hybrid event)

SPEAKERS
PROGRAM
ABSTRACTS

Manuel E. Tapia-Navarro, Ricardo A. Nicolás-Francisco, Sandra D. Cuenca: “The single correct metalogic is contradictory”

Griffiths and Paseau (2022), in their recent defense of logical monism, argue that logical pluralism has problems in the metatheoretical level. They argue that the logical pluralism that pretends to be defended in the metatheory (that responds to a single logic) is incoherent. In this paper, we argue that Griffiths and Paseau’s conclusion is not as problematic as they think, and present some reasons to say that it is possible to defend logical pluralism within a single metatheory. In particular, we will consider the case of a logical pluralism with a contradictory metatheory. We will argue that the resulting logical pluralism, if not having the same virtues as the monism characterized by Griffiths and Paseau, at least does not have the same problems as other forms of pluralism.

Manuel E. Tapia-Navarro: “The challenge of contra-classical logic to pluralism”

Stephen Read has presented and argument that pretend to show that Beall and Restall’s (well-known) account of logical pluralism can not incorporate contraclassical logics. From this, Stei conclude that is not possible to sustain a logical pluralism that includes classical logic and contraclassical logics. I show that this generalization is wrong and propose a strategy to avoid Stei’s conclusion.

Pamela Villafaña Alonso: “Logical Pluralism and metalogical reasoning”

Logical monism is the thesis according to which there is only one correct logic, while logical pluralism is the thesis that there is more than one correct logic (within the same domain). Griffiths and Paseau (2022) argue in favor of the former. To do so, they raise a number of objections in order to show that logical pluralism is untenable.

I call one of these objections the Metalogical Reasoning Objection (MRO). According to this, when we argue for (or against) logical pluralism, such argumentation takes place at a metalogical level. When we make a defense of logical pluralism, the deductive validity of the arguments raised is evaluated at the metalogical level by means of a single logic. Thus, in the attempt to argue for logical pluralism, it is inevitable to assume logical monism. Moreover, Griffiths and Paseau hold that arguing for logical pluralism using an abductive argument at the metalogical level is infeasible due to abductive reasoning is relies on deductive reasoning.

I will argue that we do not have good reasons to think that the logics that turn out to be correct for a given domain are the same logics that we must use (necessarily) to evaluate the validity of our arguments for logical pluralism at the metalogical level. Thus, not all arguments in favor of logical pluralism require to be valid in the logics that are correct for a particular domain. I will argue that this is the case of abductive arguments.

Aylén Bavosa Castro: “Can we prevent telic pluralism from being on the incessant brink of collapse?”

Telic pluralism is the thesis that logical theories are not only descriptive features of a consequence relation between sentences, but that they have in mind certain epistemic aims and norms. Epistemic truth-norms such as “believe true propositions”, or its reverse side of the coin “avoid believing false propositions”, are common among the pluralists. This is also standard practice in many epistemological fields. However, for telic pluralism to be a truly tenable position, each logical system must be accompanied by their own truth-norms. I will argue that the opposite approach results in a specific kind of collapse. Moreover, I will analyze what can be said about truth-norms with regards to metainferential systems. The type of questions I intend to answer are the following: can two different logical systems have the same type of truth-norms? In what sense is that not a collapse? And finally, is it possible to have a truth-norm pluralism, and thus a full-blooded telic pluralism? Is this avoidable?

Diego Tajer, Mariela Rubin: “Bridge Principles and Connexive Conditionals”

En este trabajo vamos a defender que la lógica clásica y las lógicas conexivas pueden ser compatibles a pesar de ser incomparables, dando lugar así a un pluralismo lógico entre estas teorías. Las lógicas conexivas son una familia de lógicas que validan principios como (AT): ⊨¬(A→¬A) y (BO): A→B⊨¬(A→¬B). Estos principios son clásicamente inválidos y dado que la lógica clásica es post-completa no es posible agregarlos sin trivialidad. Por esta razón, una lógica conexiva que valide (AT) y (BO) necesariamente debe invalidar algún principio clásicamente válido. De esto se sigue que son incomparables.

El objetivo de esta charla es argumentar que es posible sostener un pluralismo donde tanto lógica clásica como conexiva son correctas. En particular, vamos a defender que la importancia normativa de ambas teorías reside en una diferencia de contextos de aplicación del condicional. Las teorías estándar del condicional indicativo (que extienden a la lógica clásica) pueden funcionar correctamente en muchos contextos, mientras que los principios conexivos son particularmente útiles en aquellos contextos (predominantes en el discurso ordinario) donde el antecedente del condicional es contingente.

ORGANIZERS
SPONSORS

Proyectos Conahcyt CBF2023-2024-55 y PAPIIT IN406225

We are grateful for the support provided by CONICET